Harding

Strong objectivity, if I understand it coherently at all, places the "standpoint" of its epistemology at the feet of "marginalized peoples". The biggest criticism I have of this theory is that it claims that we will gain more knowledge by talking to the marginalized peoples and incorporating their viewpoints into our understanding of the world--but it nevertheless continues to compare these viewpoints and this knowledge to the dominant culture. This leads me to believe that although Harding is espousing an epistemology that is enraptured with marginalized peoples and wishes to cut off the diseased head of the dominant culture from any knowledge claims whatsoever, what she is actually describing seems to be a theory of "all access points", not just the ones from marginalized peoples, because she cannot escape the fact that these marginalized viewpoints must be compared to the dominant ones. She claims it matters where you start from. I am claiming it doesn't matter, as long as you consider them all, and I also think that she would have to concede to this point when she realizes that one cannot escape the dominant culture's viewpoints anyway.

I think Judith Butler would agree with me :) She also may propose the argument that since "gender" is most likely a social construct, it is problematic to start from the standpoint of persons whose identities have been constructed by (usually) the dominant culture in the first place.

Hopkins

It is undoubtedly Hopkins' thesis that the best way to eliminate homophobia and heterosexism is to dismantle the categories of male and female. He achieves his point by highlighting the fact that although the masculine identity is supposedly "natural", there is a cultural impetus for boys and men to purposefully maintain their masculine aura, which (he says) contradictorily implies that the masculine identity is something that one has to intentionally work at and hone. It is necessary at this point to remember that natural abilities do need honing; if someone naturally is talented at music or sports, to actually achieve any prowess at said natural talent, one must "practice, practice, practice". Moving on, Hopkins chooses not to enlighten us with a discussion on just how socially constructed masculinity is, especially in comparison with "homosexual behavior". He does not make any claims about whether sexual orientation is constructed or not, and he also does not make any claims about how constructed the anti-masculine (or homosexual) identity is. This is important to know because there is a huge difference in the assertion that A) masculinity is a constructed identity and those who do not play into this identity are embracing a more natural state of being, and the other possibility B) that the homosexual identity is also a construction, just not one sired by society. I have a feeling that Hopkins is sympathetic with option A, but it is also possible that he is a social constructionist. But not knowing his point of view on this matter greatly distracts from the acceptance or rejection of his proposal. His proposal is slightly different than his thesis; his thesis is that "heterosexism" can only be completely eradicated if there are no sex-compulsory identities... his underlying proposal is that we should eradicate these identities because it would be better to not have gender have any influence over personhood whatsoever. In the end, I agree with Hopkins' thesis (if I allow myself the assumption of his categories of what heterosexism is), but I disagree with his proposal.

Being a woman implies heterosexuality, simply because that is accepted as the natural, healthy biological fact of being a woman for most of society. I am not sure in what way the word "enforce" is being used in the second part of the question.

"Women"

I tried to make a list to see if anything on it would constitute a universally inclusive state or experience that could group together all people who see themselves or are seen as women. But I could not do it. And even if I could function on the assumption that I only have to find a 99% majority similarity, there then would have to be made yet another list that would determine why that 1% that were not originally included, but maybe wanted to be, could be included as exceptions... and then I was just back at the beginning again.

It seems that it is true that the founders of feminism felt that the factor in-common was their oppression by men. But then, as people like Spelman have pointed out, this oppression, if it existed at all, basically had only a common history with white women. So why then, once this fallacy of the movement was revealed, didn't women who were not white declare feminism an inherently exclusionary movement that could never express the history and experience of all women, and therefore could not move forward any coherent agendas? The only answer I can think of right now is because of the initial emotive pull of feminism's use of the word "women"... its claim to represent all women made those who felt their voices were not included inclined to move in and change what feminism was so that they were part of the movement. But now that they are acknowledged and included... what is "feminism", anyway? If there is no specific identity of who feminism represents, and no shared goals and platforms that feminism promotes... is it even a meaningful term any longer? Or is there still some underlying assumption on the part of all feminists that they are in fact oppressed by men? And if so, what kind of oppression is this that is universally claimable by all women? And how are we to determine and persuade that it is indeed oppression if some women reject that premise entirely?

__________________________________________________________________

Basically it seems like the only thing the feminist movement can do at this point is either 1) dismantle the embedded stereotypes (/platonic ideals) of "women" (but why and to what extent?) OR 2) create a new meaning/platonic ideal of women that will be something to live up to (but why and to what extent...) OR both. But why and to... ...yeah

Spelman

I cannot pull a good example out of my head of stereotypes that have one meaning for white women and another for black women that Spelman did not touch upon, although those particular differences she mentions (delicate, passive) can possibly be attributed to the fact that they are black, and have only found their "public voice" in more recent times, where women are expected to be more outgoing. I do, however, think that she could have talked more about how these differences are arguably more exacerbated by the type of class or even geographical location one inhabits. There is more distance between the stereotype of a poor white woman in the South and a poor white woman in Chicago than there is between a poor white woman in Chigaco and a poor black woman in Chicago. Spelman does a service by pointing out the complexity of stereotypes and oppression, but her scope is certainly ignoring many groups that completely change stereotypes, and I am sure she would agree with me that things like location, age, class, political disposition, etc., sometimes end up obfuscating certain groups, such as conservative black women. Obviously this is not the best example because "conservatism" is not usually seen as an identity that is oppressed, but hopefully you understand my point.

On to some easily identifiable differences in stereotypes for my brain right now, thinking of white housewives (or grandmothers), it could be said that there is a stereotype of them drinking an awful lot of wine. Lots of movies and television shows show them almost constantly with a wine glass in hand. But if you put an Alaska Native, or any American Indian, in said position, it would start to become another, much more negative stereotype of a dangerous, crazy alcoholic. The truth of someone constantly with a wine glass in hand probably lies somewhere between the two stereotypes (the first mostly neutral, the second certainly negative), but there is probably no dispute that they are treated differently. I suppose this is more a case of how stereotypes shape our conceptions of people in the same position rather than pointing out what we believe the different positions to be because of stereotypes, but I believe it basically gets across the same point.

I think that the majority of women do have some things universally in common, and that these things are enough to support a movement that benefits their mutual welfare; although the things I think they have in common can easily be seen as things that most humans have in common.